About selected philosophical questions of the past and today, with Egon Bondy (1930-2007).
Before and after the regime change in 1989, he was a spiritual leader of the Czechoslovak underground. I met Bondy at the coffee U Anjelov in Bratislava in 2003, and we started talking about philosophy. We made an appointment for the interview couple of months later in a flat he was living. The author of philosophical texts, fictions, poetry musicalized by the cult band Plastic People of the Universe, (once) friend with important figures like writer Bohumil Hrabal or dissident / president Václav Havel. He was also known as an interpreter of Marx, oriental philosophy, science and 'futurist' predicting the rise of China or financial crisis (2008).
Dear Naomi,
Walking along the human skeletons inside of the Parisian catacombs,
I'm aware that wherever u r, whatever u do, we remain like
night and day, life and death, truth and lie...
How could it exist alone?
There has not been such actor yet to express my joy, or except
me as a child watching falling laminas of the roses,
collecting them into the sack put under my pillow.
Happier than happiest?
Foolish warmongers drumming to celebrate a 'victory'
Hurting those without choice, never man 2 man, face 2 face
The rats are braver...
But could I be better (please)?
Some believe behind something, is something, is something...
While I see nothing behind us Naomi, neither in front of us,
nor aside, nor above, nor below...
Like a full cup through which water spills over...
Is philosophy possible..?
Miro...
Dear Miro,
I'm promoting the acrobatic shows in Shanghai and Beijing,
so I had no time to write you earlier. And then believe or not,
I could not find a post office... How horrible!
I hope u r already out of the catacombs, it's cold there, u could get flu!
And if you don't see anything above, please visit our oculist, because
right now so many people are standing on the podium above me,
but I like it...
I know you have always loved flowers, maybe you had been florist or
gardener in your previous life, although not sure (just kidding)...
You are philosophy, my tiny philosopher...
And so brave.... braver than a rat :)
See u soon.
Kiss
...Naomi
Chess composition and music
Before and after the regime change in 1989, he was a spiritual leader of the Czechoslovak underground. I met Bondy at the coffee U Anjelov in Bratislava in 2003, and we started talking about philosophy. We made an appointment for the interview couple of months later in a flat he was living. The author of philosophical texts, fictions, poetry musicalized by the cult band Plastic People of the Universe, (once) friend with important figures like writer Bohumil Hrabal or dissident / president Václav Havel. He was also known as an interpreter of Marx, oriental philosophy, science and 'futurist' predicting the rise of China or financial crisis (2008).
I redefine the existential view of decision that is incomplete and show why 'social science' can be mathematized.
Estamos de nuevo en el principio
Acerca de ciertas cuestiones filosóficas del pasado y del presente, con Egon Bondy (1930-2007). Antes y después del cambio de régimen en 1989, fue un líder espiritual del movimiento clandestino de Checoslovaquia. Conocí a Bondy en el café U Anjelov en Bratislava en 2003, y empezamos a hablar de filosofía. Nos citamos para la entrevista un par de meses más tarde en el piso en el que estaba viviendo. El autor de los textos filosóficos, ficciones, poesía musicalizada por la Banda de culto Plastic People of the Universe, (una vez) amigo de figuras importantes como el escritor Bohumil Hrabal o disidente / presidente Václav Havel. También fue conocido como intérprete de Marx, la filosofía oriental, la ciencia, y 'futurista' prediciendo el surgimiento de China o la crisis financiera (2008).
Explico por qué es la visión existencial de la decisión incompleta y por qué la "ciencia social" se puede matematizado.
What's philosopher's work about?
The philosopher does not fable, just generalizes our experience gathered during centuries. This way sooner or later, the speech about everything will come out...
The philosopher does not fable, just generalizes our experience gathered during centuries. This way sooner or later, the speech about everything will come out...
¿De qué trata la obra del filósofo?
El filósofo no fabula, sólo generaliza nuestra experiencia acumulada durante siglos.
De esta manera, tarde o temprano, el discurso surgirá...
El filósofo no fabula, sólo generaliza nuestra experiencia acumulada durante siglos.
De esta manera, tarde o temprano, el discurso surgirá...
¿Cuál es el significado de la filosofía hoy?
Cada campo de la ciencia o el arte tiene su algoritmo evolutivo causado por toda la cadena de condiciones. La ciencia contemporánea se enfrenta a cuestiones insolubles por su metodología o herramientas. Las revistas científicas piden a los filósofos que no olviden su fama más allá y contribuyan de nuevo...
Cada campo de la ciencia o el arte tiene su algoritmo evolutivo causado por toda la cadena de condiciones. La ciencia contemporánea se enfrenta a cuestiones insolubles por su metodología o herramientas. Las revistas científicas piden a los filósofos que no olviden su fama más allá y contribuyan de nuevo...
What's the meaning of the philosophy today?
Each scientific or art field has its evolutionary algorithm caused by the whole chain of conditions. Contemporary science faces questions insoluble by its methodology or tools. Scientific journals ask philosophers, not to forget their past fame and contribute again...
Each scientific or art field has its evolutionary algorithm caused by the whole chain of conditions. Contemporary science faces questions insoluble by its methodology or tools. Scientific journals ask philosophers, not to forget their past fame and contribute again...
¿Por qué la ciencia no puede responder a todas las preguntas ?
Está limitada por su metodología, excepto la exploración de las cosas fuera de nuestra experiencia empírica o sensible. Augusto Comte (1798-1857) determina estos límites, sin los cuales la ciencia no es exacta. Las preguntas metafísicas y axiológicas no pueden ser verificadas por la ciencia.
Está limitada por su metodología, excepto la exploración de las cosas fuera de nuestra experiencia empírica o sensible. Augusto Comte (1798-1857) determina estos límites, sin los cuales la ciencia no es exacta. Las preguntas metafísicas y axiológicas no pueden ser verificadas por la ciencia.
Why science can't answer all questions?
It is restricted by its methodology, excluding exploration of the things out of our empirical
or sensual experience. August Comte (1798-1857) determined these limits, without which the science is not exact. Metaphysical and axiological questions are so unverifiable by science.
It is restricted by its methodology, excluding exploration of the things out of our empirical
or sensual experience. August Comte (1798-1857) determined these limits, without which the science is not exact. Metaphysical and axiological questions are so unverifiable by science.
Can philosophy discover anything by itself?
Although philosophy accepted the game on science, dealing still more with secondary issues, many inventions came only from its own resources, which brought a big progress.
Although philosophy accepted the game on science, dealing still more with secondary issues, many inventions came only from its own resources, which brought a big progress.
¿Puede la filosofía descubrir algo por sí misma?
Aunque la filosofía aceptó el juego en la ciencia, tratando aún más con cuestiones secundarias, muchas invenciones vinieron sólo de sus propios recursos, lo que trajo un gran avance.
Aunque la filosofía aceptó el juego en la ciencia, tratando aún más con cuestiones secundarias, muchas invenciones vinieron sólo de sus propios recursos, lo que trajo un gran avance.
Which philosophers contributed most?
Apart from Nietzsche (1844-1900), from the pure philosophers without contacts with science, it was Heidegger (1889-1976), who discovered a new unanticipated space by a philosophical speculative rational reduction.
Apart from Nietzsche (1844-1900), from the pure philosophers without contacts with science, it was Heidegger (1889-1976), who discovered a new unanticipated space by a philosophical speculative rational reduction.
The fear of the finiteness?
Rather responsibility. In Heidegger's view, human decides at every moment, so can't be irresponsible. The notion 'Dasein' defines a specific human being: a situation of a permanent alert, in which must decide. Humans can't give up their free decision defining their space. 'We are cursed with freedom' as Sartre simplified it...
Rather responsibility. In Heidegger's view, human decides at every moment, so can't be irresponsible. The notion 'Dasein' defines a specific human being: a situation of a permanent alert, in which must decide. Humans can't give up their free decision defining their space. 'We are cursed with freedom' as Sartre simplified it...
¿Qué filósofos fueron los que más contribuyeron?
Además de Nietzsche (1844-1900), de los filósofos puros sin contactos con la ciencia, fue Heidegger (1889-1976), quien descubrió un nuevo espacio no previsto por una reducción racional especulativa filosófica.
Además de Nietzsche (1844-1900), de los filósofos puros sin contactos con la ciencia, fue Heidegger (1889-1976), quien descubrió un nuevo espacio no previsto por una reducción racional especulativa filosófica.
El miedo a lo finito?
Más bien la responsabilidad. En opinión de Heidegger, los humanos deciden en cada momento, por lo que no puede ser irresponsable. La idea de 'Dasein' define un ser humano específico: una situación de alerta permanente, en el que debe decidir. Los humanos no pueden renunciar a su decisión libre de definir su espacio. 'Nos han maldecido a la libertad', como Sartre simplificó.
Más bien la responsabilidad. En opinión de Heidegger, los humanos deciden en cada momento, por lo que no puede ser irresponsable. La idea de 'Dasein' define un ser humano específico: una situación de alerta permanente, en el que debe decidir. Los humanos no pueden renunciar a su decisión libre de definir su espacio. 'Nos han maldecido a la libertad', como Sartre simplificó.
Was Heidegger the most important philosopher of the 20th century?
Could be said. Some philosophers had touched this problem, but no one made systematic analysis. Heidegger exactly and accurately mapped it, that was a great cognitive achievement. At first people liked its popular form of the so called Existentialism, then it started haunting them...
Could be said. Some philosophers had touched this problem, but no one made systematic analysis. Heidegger exactly and accurately mapped it, that was a great cognitive achievement. At first people liked its popular form of the so called Existentialism, then it started haunting them...
Fue Heidegger el filósofo más importante del siglo XX?
Podría ser. Algunos filósofos habían tocado este problema, pero nadie hizo un análisis sistemático. Heidegger lo asigna con exactitud y precisión, eso fue un gran logro cognitivo. Al principio a la gente le gustaba su forma popular del llamado existencialismo, luego empezó a asustarle.
Podría ser. Algunos filósofos habían tocado este problema, pero nadie hizo un análisis sistemático. Heidegger lo asigna con exactitud y precisión, eso fue un gran logro cognitivo. Al principio a la gente le gustaba su forma popular del llamado existencialismo, luego empezó a asustarle.
Why?
Because its conclusion is unpleasant. Ceaseless deciding is exhausting, especially if I realize consequences. Each decision creates a risk, and responsibility, which people don't want to listen.
Because its conclusion is unpleasant. Ceaseless deciding is exhausting, especially if I realize consequences. Each decision creates a risk, and responsibility, which people don't want to listen.
Is it related to intelligence to understand that?
It is related also to intelligence, but mainly people don't like do and listen it.
It is related also to intelligence, but mainly people don't like do and listen it.
Too few options may disable a decision...
It depends on opportunities, but from purely philosophical view the decision is simple: always between alternatives. In the extreme, between life or death.
It depends on opportunities, but from purely philosophical view the decision is simple: always between alternatives. In the extreme, between life or death.
¿Por qué?
Debido a que su conclusión es desagradable. Decidir incesantemente es agotador, especialmente si me doy cuenta de las consecuencias. Cada decisión crea un riesgo, y la responsabilidad, que la gente no quiere escuchar.
Debido a que su conclusión es desagradable. Decidir incesantemente es agotador, especialmente si me doy cuenta de las consecuencias. Cada decisión crea un riesgo, y la responsabilidad, que la gente no quiere escuchar.
Demasiadas pocas opciones pueden desactivar una decisión...
Depende de las oportunidades, pero desde la vista puramente filosófica la decisión es simple: siempre entre alternativas. En el extremo, entre la vida o la muerte.
Depende de las oportunidades, pero desde la vista puramente filosófica la decisión es simple: siempre entre alternativas. En el extremo, entre la vida o la muerte.
¿Está relacionado con la inteligencia para entender eso?
Se relaciona también con la inteligencia, pero sobre todo la gente no le gusta hacerlo y escucharlo.
Se relaciona también con la inteligencia, pero sobre todo la gente no le gusta hacerlo y escucharlo.
Awareness of better opportunities elsewhere, creates a big frustration.
In case of survival frustration is luxury. Each problem, regardless of conditions, is reducible to binary system: yes or no. It is a phenomenological reduction valid in science too.
In case of survival frustration is luxury. Each problem, regardless of conditions, is reducible to binary system: yes or no. It is a phenomenological reduction valid in science too.
Here I was unsatisfied with the answer.
After I left the flat, was thinking of a situation preventing decision. If somebody is killing you, you can't decide to stay alive at that moment. Or: you can't marry yourself, some people can't get visa... You can limitlessly decide about often unimportant things: sleep on the left or right, hold breath for 1, 2, X seconds... But you can't decide in many relevant cases, unless others allow you. It is odd why Heidegger, Sartre overlooked* it. Sartre once said he surprised himself how radical he had been. *The post-war society thirsty for strong ideas could explain the popularity of slightly oversimplified Existential theses.
After I left the flat, was thinking of a situation preventing decision. If somebody is killing you, you can't decide to stay alive at that moment. Or: you can't marry yourself, some people can't get visa... You can limitlessly decide about often unimportant things: sleep on the left or right, hold breath for 1, 2, X seconds... But you can't decide in many relevant cases, unless others allow you. It is odd why Heidegger, Sartre overlooked* it. Sartre once said he surprised himself how radical he had been. *The post-war society thirsty for strong ideas could explain the popularity of slightly oversimplified Existential theses.
My decision depends on opportunity: others' permission, my intellect to realize the opportunity, and reality of physical limits: I must eat, can't fly... My intellect can be misled by pseudo-opportunity e.g. lottery. A decision to make money* in a lottery is pseudo-opportunity, as it is on average impossible (owners of lotteries make money, not players). There are multi-dependencies too: others may (not) allow me opportunity, but at the same time my decisions contribute to others' opportunities, with a statistical asymmetry: I influence others much less than vice verse (except my position is powerful). *There can be more reasons to play a lottery: fun, excitement, which are not pseudo-opportunities. But to play a lottery for money is pseudo-opportunity.
The existential necessity to decide is incomplete because:
a) I can't sometimes decide, unless others allow me
b) I can't exceed reality regardless if it is idealistic Plato, Kant, irrational Schopenhauer or different.
c) My intellect may overlook the opportunity to decide, or be tempted by pseudo-opportunity.
b) I can't exceed reality regardless if it is idealistic Plato, Kant, irrational Schopenhauer or different.
c) My intellect may overlook the opportunity to decide, or be tempted by pseudo-opportunity.
Corrected concept of Sartre is: 'we are SOMETIMES sentenced to freedom'. The new could be: One of us will die first connecting my and other decision with reality. I can decide when I die (except sudden dead) just in terms of .XY second. Observing my dying, asking myself: am I dead or not yet? When I'll decide 'I am dead', I could still a little hold on by .0XY second to eternally delay my choice to die Zeno paradox 490-30 BC, Democritus 460-370 BC. Observing your dying, I must once decide: 'you are dead', while I could still a bit postpone that choice. So I can choose a moment when I or you die, but I can't decide we never die (religion is other issue). The reality is then over my decision. My intellect that I can't directly change, is a given part of reality too. Then it seems my decision is computable from the reality (+ others' decisions, my intellect), except few moments. E.g. now I can decide to stop writing, or you can decide to stop reading.
Some economists say: cigarette's price don't influence decision (not) to smoke. As an inelastic good: price of bread or water has little impact on its consumption. But in a famine you can't eat at any price: shortage affects average consumption, the black market only partially compensates it Prohibition 1920-33 cut alcohol use, G. Becker's addiction model 1988: cigarette's cost reduces average smoking. The liberal economics overestimates the individual decisions at the expense of the reality and others' decisions. It prefers richer (or otherwise influential), whose positions enable them to (at least temporarily) deny others and reality. Real liberalism should offer more opportunities for all regardless of their positions. This could spillover: more options to decide enable me to decide to enable others more and vice verse. Comparing 1) I have all opportunities (=God), others none, 2) all have same opportunities. The latter one has more opportunities in overall as they can be mutually combined. The difference in intellect (ability to discover opportunities) may mean: to maximize total opportunities (for all), society should prefer intellect.
Understanding of decision (why, when, what) needs a new logic, like Descartes' Cartesian system or Euclid's geometry helping Newton to mathematize natural laws (quantum physics added statistics). Game theory (1944) has such potential, but oversimplifies motivation excluding 'irrational' behavior or externalities. What does a suicide, schizophrenic, or a dying person maximize? Also it ignores difference in intellect with potentially different outcomes. It does not mean we can't mathematize or verify psychology or society. The claim it can't be exactly defined, is true till it is exactly defined. Same could be said before Newton: 'we can't mathematize motion, light, gravitation'.
Y aquí estaba yo insatisfecho con la respuesta.
Tras dejar el piso, estuve pensando sobre la situación de decidir. Si alguien te está matando, no se podria decidir si seguir con vida en ese momento. O, no puedes casarte contigo mismo, algunas personas no pueden obtener la visa. En la mayoria de los casos se puede decidir cosas sin importancia: dormir sobre el lado izquierdo o el derecho, mantener la respiracion durante 1, 2, o X segundos... Pero no se podria decidir en muchos casos relevantes, si los demás no nos lo permiten. Es curioso por qué Heidegger y Sartre se pasan* por alto que. Sartre dijo una vez que él se sorprendió de lo radical que había sido.*La sociedad de la post-guerra hambrienta de fuertes ideas podría explicar la popularidad de las tesis existenciales ligeramente simplificado.
Mi decisión depende de la oportunidad (del permiso de los demás), mi intelecto para darme cuenta de la oportunidad, y la realidad de los límites físicos: Necesito comer, no puedo volar... Mi intelecto puede ser inducido a error pseudo-oportunidades como p. e. la lotería. La decisión de hacer dinero* en la lotería es pseudo-oportunidad, ya que es estadisticamente imposible (los dueños de la lotería hacen dinero, no los jugadores). Hay múltiples dependencias también: otros pueden (o no) permitirme la oportunidad, pero al mismo tiempo mis decisiones contribuyen a oportunidades de los demás, con una asimetría estadística: yo influyo en los demas mucho menos que ellos en mi (excepto si mi posición es importante). *No puede haber más razones para jugar una lotería: diversión, emoción, todos lo cuales no son pseudo-oportunidades. Pero jugar una lotería por dinero seria pseudo-oportunidad.
La necesidad existencial para decidir esta incompleta porque:
a) No puedo decidir a veces, a menos que otros me lo permitan.
b) No se puede exceder la realidad independientemente si es idealista Platón, Kant, irracional Schopenhauer o diferente.
c) Mi intelecto pueden pasar por encima la oportunidad de decidir, o ser tentado por la pseudo-oportunidad.
a) No puedo decidir a veces, a menos que otros me lo permitan.
b) No se puede exceder la realidad independientemente si es idealista Platón, Kant, irracional Schopenhauer o diferente.
c) Mi intelecto pueden pasar por encima la oportunidad de decidir, o ser tentado por la pseudo-oportunidad.
La correccion del concepto de Sartre es: 'A VECES estamos condenados a la libertad ". Otra forma podría ser 'Uno de nosotros morira primero" conectandome mi decision y la de otros con la realidad. Puedo decidir cuando morir (excepto en muerte súbita) sólo en términos de 0.XY segundos. Observando mi muerte, puedo preguntarme: ¿estoy muerto o todavía no? Cuando voy a decidir 'estoy muerto', todavía podría tener un poco de control sobre por un .0XY segundo para retrasar eternamente mi opcion de morir Zeno paradoja 490-30 aCo, Demócrito 460-370 aC. Observando otra muerte, tu debes decidir: "tu estás muerto", mientras que todavía podria posponer un poco esa decisión. Así que podriamos elegir el momento en el que morir, pero no podemos decidir el nunca morir (la religión es otro tema). La realidad es entonces sobre mi decisión. Mi intelecto que no puedo intercambiar directamente es una parte de la realidad también. Entonces parece que mi decisión depende completamente de la realidad (+ decisiones de los demás, mi intelecto), excepto en algunas ocasiones. Por ejemplo, ahora puedo decidir dejar de escribir, o tu puedes elegir dejar de leer.
Algunos economistas dicen: el precio del tabaco no puede afectar en la decisión (o no) de fumar. Como inelástica buena: el precio del pan o del agua tiene poco impacto en la media de consumo. En situacion de hambre extrema no se puede comer bajo ningun precio: la escasez afecta el consumo medio, el mercado negro sólo parcialmente lo compensa la prohibición disminuye el consumo de alcohol 1920-1933, en el modelo de adicción de G. Becker de 1988 el precio del tabaco reduce la media de consumo. La economía liberal sobreestima el poder de las decisiones individuales a expensas de la realidad y de las decisiones de los demás. Se prefiere más ricos (u otras influencias) cuyas importantes posiciones permitirá (al menos temporalmente) ignorar a otros y la realidad. Sin embargo, el liberalismo debe ofrecer más oportunidades para todos independientemente de sus posiciones. Esto podría tener multiples consecuencias: Como que yo tenga más tiempo para decidir, pueda permitir que los demas decidan mas y viceversa. Comparando 1) Tengo todas las oportunidades (= Dios), otros ninguna, 2) todos tienen las mismas oportunidades. En este segundo caso,habria más oportunidades en general,ya que se podrian combinar entre todos nosotros. La diferencia en la inteligencia (capacidad de descubrir oportunidades) es que puede maximizar las oportunidades (para todos), la sociedad debería favorecer hacia el intelecto.
Comprensión de decisión (por qué, cuándo, qué) necesita una nueva lógica, como el sistema cartesiano Descartes o la geometría de Euclides ayuda a Newton a matematizar las leyes naturales (física cuántica anadiendo estadística). La teoría de juegos (1944) tiene tal potencial, pero simplifica demasiado la motivacion excluyendo el comportamiento irracional y las externalidades. ¿Qué hace maximizar un suicidio, la esquizofrenia, o a una persona moribunda? También esto ignora la diferencia en la inteligencia potencialmente con diferentes resultados. Esto no significa que no podamos verificar o matematizar la psicología o la sociedad. La afirmación de que no se puede definir exactamente, es cierto hasta que se define. Mismamente, se puede decir antes de Newton: 'no podemos matematizar el movimiento, la luz, la gravitación'.
Conciencia de mejores oportunidades en otros lugares, crea una gran frustración.
En el caso de la frustración de supervivencia es el lujo. Cada problema, independientemente de las condiciones, se puede reducir a sistema binario: sí o no. Se trata de una reducción fenomenológica válida en la ciencia también.
En el caso de la frustración de supervivencia es el lujo. Cada problema, independientemente de las condiciones, se puede reducir a sistema binario: sí o no. Se trata de una reducción fenomenológica válida en la ciencia también.
Some Marxists regarded Existentialism as a subjective irrationality...
I don’t think Marxists could say so. Sartre (1905-1980) and Jaspers (1883-1969), considered Marx (1818-1883) as their direct ancestor. Together with Heidegger they adopted Marx's analysis of alienation as well as other categories.
I don’t think Marxists could say so. Sartre (1905-1980) and Jaspers (1883-1969), considered Marx (1818-1883) as their direct ancestor. Together with Heidegger they adopted Marx's analysis of alienation as well as other categories.
What’s reason of alienation?
Marx derived it from historical-economic relations, and claimed the ideology is false conscience. Heidegger's alienation means that instead of your life, you live according to media, advert, ideology. Then you are alienated to your own life, recognizing merely what is and nothing behind. The basic mistake is to think that by cognition of that 100 is 100, we cognize Being. This prevents us from awareness of we live in a space of freedom and responsibility. We behave thoughtlessly without feeling responsibility for our own actions, losing human dimension becoming an intelligent animal. It has nothing to do with 'irrational subjectivism'. Those critics probably meant Husserl's phenomenology.
Marx derived it from historical-economic relations, and claimed the ideology is false conscience. Heidegger's alienation means that instead of your life, you live according to media, advert, ideology. Then you are alienated to your own life, recognizing merely what is and nothing behind. The basic mistake is to think that by cognition of that 100 is 100, we cognize Being. This prevents us from awareness of we live in a space of freedom and responsibility. We behave thoughtlessly without feeling responsibility for our own actions, losing human dimension becoming an intelligent animal. It has nothing to do with 'irrational subjectivism'. Those critics probably meant Husserl's phenomenology.
Algunos marxistas consideran el existencialismo como una irracionalidad subjetiva...
No creo que los marxistas pudieran decir que sí. Sartre (1905-1980) y Jaspers (1883-1969), consideraron a Marx (1818-1883) como su antepasado directo. Junto con Heidegger adoptaron el análisis de Marx de la alienación, así como otras categorías.
No creo que los marxistas pudieran decir que sí. Sartre (1905-1980) y Jaspers (1883-1969), consideraron a Marx (1818-1883) como su antepasado directo. Junto con Heidegger adoptaron el análisis de Marx de la alienación, así como otras categorías.
¿Cuál es la razón de la alienación?
Marx derivó de las relaciones histórico-económicas, y reclamó que la ideología es falsa conciencia. La enajenación de Heidegger quiere decir que en vez de su vida, se vive de acuerdo con los medios de comunicación, anuncio, ideología. Entonces estás alienado a su propia vida, reconociendo simplemente lo que es y sin nada detrás. El error básico es pensar que por el conocimiento de que 100 es 100, que conozcamos el Ser. Esto nos impide saber que vivimos en un espacio de libertad y de responsabilidad. Nos comportamos sin pensar, sin sentir la responsabilidad de nuestras propias acciones, la pérdida de la dimensión humana de convertirse en un animal inteligente. No tiene nada que ver con el "subjetivismo irracional". Esas críticas probablemente significaban la fenomenología de Husserl.
Marx derivó de las relaciones histórico-económicas, y reclamó que la ideología es falsa conciencia. La enajenación de Heidegger quiere decir que en vez de su vida, se vive de acuerdo con los medios de comunicación, anuncio, ideología. Entonces estás alienado a su propia vida, reconociendo simplemente lo que es y sin nada detrás. El error básico es pensar que por el conocimiento de que 100 es 100, que conozcamos el Ser. Esto nos impide saber que vivimos en un espacio de libertad y de responsabilidad. Nos comportamos sin pensar, sin sentir la responsabilidad de nuestras propias acciones, la pérdida de la dimensión humana de convertirse en un animal inteligente. No tiene nada que ver con el "subjetivismo irracional". Esas críticas probablemente significaban la fenomenología de Husserl.
Husserl focused more on the things...
...he was dealing with a cognition and its reliability. He claimed that scientific knowledge is maybe useful, but unreal. In Heideggerian language, philosophy and science cognize Dasein: a surface and its characteristics or inner relations, but nothing else. It is an idealistic position coming from Plato (427-347 BC). Husserl (1859-1938) expressed it by modern terminology similar to Kant's critique of the pure reason - only without using 'thing in itself'.
...he was dealing with a cognition and its reliability. He claimed that scientific knowledge is maybe useful, but unreal. In Heideggerian language, philosophy and science cognize Dasein: a surface and its characteristics or inner relations, but nothing else. It is an idealistic position coming from Plato (427-347 BC). Husserl (1859-1938) expressed it by modern terminology similar to Kant's critique of the pure reason - only without using 'thing in itself'.
Husserl se centró más en las cosas...
...que estaba tratando con una cognición y su fiabilidad. Afirmó que el conocimiento científico es quizá útil, pero irreal. En el lenguaje de Heidegger, la filosofía y la ciencia llegan a conocer a Dasein: una superficie y sus características o relaciones internas, pero nada más. Es una posición idealista que viene de Platón (427-347 aC). Husserl (1859-1938) lo expresó de la terminología moderna similar a la crítica kantiana de la razón pura - sólo sin utilizar "cosa en sí".
...que estaba tratando con una cognición y su fiabilidad. Afirmó que el conocimiento científico es quizá útil, pero irreal. En el lenguaje de Heidegger, la filosofía y la ciencia llegan a conocer a Dasein: una superficie y sus características o relaciones internas, pero nada más. Es una posición idealista que viene de Platón (427-347 aC). Husserl (1859-1938) lo expresó de la terminología moderna similar a la crítica kantiana de la razón pura - sólo sin utilizar "cosa en sí".
Can be a perception of mentally ill truer?
We can’t say our seeing is right. It depends whether our world is only our conception, as thought Schopenhauer (1788-1860) or Ladislav Klíma (1878-1928) - the base for which was given by Kant (1724-1804). We think according to our structure of thinking, but we can’t know if this structure shows the reality as it is. Neither European philosophy has resolved this problem, nor Plato where we perceive mere reflexes, mirrors, imprints of the reality...
We can’t say our seeing is right. It depends whether our world is only our conception, as thought Schopenhauer (1788-1860) or Ladislav Klíma (1878-1928) - the base for which was given by Kant (1724-1804). We think according to our structure of thinking, but we can’t know if this structure shows the reality as it is. Neither European philosophy has resolved this problem, nor Plato where we perceive mere reflexes, mirrors, imprints of the reality...
Puede ser una percepción de la mente enferma más verdadera?
No podemos decir que nuestra visión es correcta. Depende de si nuestro mundo es sólo nuestra concepción, como el pensamiento de Schopenhauer (1788-1860) o Ladislav Klíma (1878-1928) - la base que fue dada por Kant (1724-1804). Pensamos de acuerdo con nuestra estructura de pensamiento, pero no podemos saber si esta estructura muestra la realidad tal como es. Ni la filosofía europea ha resuelto este problema, ni Platón donde percibimos meros reflejos, los espejos, las impresiones de la realidad ...
No podemos decir que nuestra visión es correcta. Depende de si nuestro mundo es sólo nuestra concepción, como el pensamiento de Schopenhauer (1788-1860) o Ladislav Klíma (1878-1928) - la base que fue dada por Kant (1724-1804). Pensamos de acuerdo con nuestra estructura de pensamiento, pero no podemos saber si esta estructura muestra la realidad tal como es. Ni la filosofía europea ha resuelto este problema, ni Platón donde percibimos meros reflejos, los espejos, las impresiones de la realidad ...
Can we philosophically understand the logic of schizophrenia?
Schizophrenics can do ritual activities like sitting behind computer, but they interpret everything differently. Their thinking is closer to symbolic world unlike ours. We know almost nothing about their inner life, except that they don't lose conscience in the hardest catatonic phase, when can’t move. Schizophrenic dreamed worlds could be deformed heuristic reality. It seems defective, but it can try to view relations in our reality more accurately.
¿Podemos entender filosóficamente la lógica de la esquizofrenia?
Los esquizofrénicos pueden hacer actividades rituales como estar sentado detrás del ordenador, pero interpretar todo de manera diferente. Su pensamiento está más cerca de mundo simbólico a diferencia de la nuestra. No sabemos casi nada acerca de su vida interior, a excepción de que no pierden la conciencia en la fase más dura del estado catatónico, cuando no se puede mover. Mundos soñados esquizofrénicos podrían deformar la realidad heurística. Parece defectuoso, pero puede tratar de ver las relaciones en nuestra realidad con mayor precisión.
Schizophrenics can do ritual activities like sitting behind computer, but they interpret everything differently. Their thinking is closer to symbolic world unlike ours. We know almost nothing about their inner life, except that they don't lose conscience in the hardest catatonic phase, when can’t move. Schizophrenic dreamed worlds could be deformed heuristic reality. It seems defective, but it can try to view relations in our reality more accurately.
¿Podemos entender filosóficamente la lógica de la esquizofrenia?
Los esquizofrénicos pueden hacer actividades rituales como estar sentado detrás del ordenador, pero interpretar todo de manera diferente. Su pensamiento está más cerca de mundo simbólico a diferencia de la nuestra. No sabemos casi nada acerca de su vida interior, a excepción de que no pierden la conciencia en la fase más dura del estado catatónico, cuando no se puede mover. Mundos soñados esquizofrénicos podrían deformar la realidad heurística. Parece defectuoso, pero puede tratar de ver las relaciones en nuestra realidad con mayor precisión.
Wittgenstein thought such reasoning useless.The problem is a language...
If somebody deals long with logic, it can lead him to such conclusion. Nevertheless philosophy can’t be reduced to a problem or structure of language. And that the language means more than just communication, as Wittgenstein (1889-1951) concludes, was known long time.
If somebody deals long with logic, it can lead him to such conclusion. Nevertheless philosophy can’t be reduced to a problem or structure of language. And that the language means more than just communication, as Wittgenstein (1889-1951) concludes, was known long time.
Wittgenstein pensaba que tal razonamiento inútil. El problema es un lenguaje...
Si alguien trata de largo con la lógica, puede conducirlo a tal conclusión. Sin embargo la filosofía no puede reducirse a un problema o una estructura del lenguaje. Y que el lenguaje significa algo más que la comunicación, como Wittgenstein (1889-1951) llega a la conclusión, era conocido mucho tiempo.
Si alguien trata de largo con la lógica, puede conducirlo a tal conclusión. Sin embargo la filosofía no puede reducirse a un problema o una estructura del lenguaje. Y que el lenguaje significa algo más que la comunicación, como Wittgenstein (1889-1951) llega a la conclusión, era conocido mucho tiempo.
Bajo el mismo nombre que todos pueden percibir cosas diferentes. Veo negro como se ve blanco...
La percepción ya es interpretación. En este rincón tengo una buena orientación, sé dónde puedo poner mis manos, dónde están las cosas, etc. Una fotografía de este rincón mostraría algo completamente diferente desde mi percepción. Ver este rincón, la manipulación de las cosas aquí es una interpretación. Así que puedo cambiar la realidad de mi percepción.
La percepción ya es interpretación. En este rincón tengo una buena orientación, sé dónde puedo poner mis manos, dónde están las cosas, etc. Una fotografía de este rincón mostraría algo completamente diferente desde mi percepción. Ver este rincón, la manipulación de las cosas aquí es una interpretación. Así que puedo cambiar la realidad de mi percepción.
Under the same name all can perceive different things. I can see black as you see white...
Perception is already interpretation. In this corner I have a good orientation, know where can put my hands, where are things etc. A photography of this corner would show something entirely different from my perception. Seeing of this corner, handling of things here is an interpretation. So I change reality by my perception.
Perception is already interpretation. In this corner I have a good orientation, know where can put my hands, where are things etc. A photography of this corner would show something entirely different from my perception. Seeing of this corner, handling of things here is an interpretation. So I change reality by my perception.
Being alone in the world, I could think anyhow. In the presence of others, my truth must be confirmed by them. How much is truth a convention?
According to contemporary philosophical reasoning, especially in ontology, the role of observer is a lot bigger than before. Observer somehow co-creates the reality, when he or more people share the creator's persuasion. Today we see the world differently from scientists in 17th century, although sensually we perceive it alike.
According to contemporary philosophical reasoning, especially in ontology, the role of observer is a lot bigger than before. Observer somehow co-creates the reality, when he or more people share the creator's persuasion. Today we see the world differently from scientists in 17th century, although sensually we perceive it alike.
Estar solo en el mundo, que se me ocurrió de todos modos. En presencia de los demás, mi verdad debe ser confirmada por ellos. ¿Cuándo es verdad una convención?
Según el razonamiento filosófico contemporáneo, sobre todo en la ontología, el papel de observador es mucho más grande que antes. El observador de alguna manera ayuda a crear la realidad, cuando él o más personas comparten la persuasión del creador. Hoy vemos el mundo de manera diferente a la de los científicos en el siglo XVII, aunque sensiblemente lo percibimos igual.
Según el razonamiento filosófico contemporáneo, sobre todo en la ontología, el papel de observador es mucho más grande que antes. El observador de alguna manera ayuda a crear la realidad, cuando él o más personas comparten la persuasión del creador. Hoy vemos el mundo de manera diferente a la de los científicos en el siglo XVII, aunque sensiblemente lo percibimos igual.
That change is on the level of conscience?
Yes. Although we can't feel elementary particles, knowledge that all comprise of them, tells us that our conception about the coherence of our environment is useful, but apparently only pragmatic truth. This problem is in science too. It is not the only problem, but it will remain one of the important ones. It became very actual, when against the Einstein's theory, still in its essence Newtonian, stood the quantum theory.
Yes. Although we can't feel elementary particles, knowledge that all comprise of them, tells us that our conception about the coherence of our environment is useful, but apparently only pragmatic truth. This problem is in science too. It is not the only problem, but it will remain one of the important ones. It became very actual, when against the Einstein's theory, still in its essence Newtonian, stood the quantum theory.
Ese cambio está en el nivel de consciencia?
Sí. Aunque no podemos sentir las partículas elementales, el conocimiento de que todos forman parte de ellas, nos dice que nuestra concepción acerca de la coherencia de nuestro medio ambiente es útil, pero al parecer sólo la verdad pragmática. Este problema es en la ciencia también. No es el único problema, pero seguirá siendo uno de los más importantes. Llegó a ser muy real, cuando en contra de la teoría de Einstein, aún en su esencia newtoniana, se puso la teoría cuántica.
Sí. Aunque no podemos sentir las partículas elementales, el conocimiento de que todos forman parte de ellas, nos dice que nuestra concepción acerca de la coherencia de nuestro medio ambiente es útil, pero al parecer sólo la verdad pragmática. Este problema es en la ciencia también. No es el único problema, pero seguirá siendo uno de los más importantes. Llegó a ser muy real, cuando en contra de la teoría de Einstein, aún en su esencia newtoniana, se puso la teoría cuántica.
That time some scientists including Einstein (1879-1955) rejected the quantum mechanics.
They had been fighting till the movement of micro-particles was photographically demonstrated throughout the 1950 and 1960s. We have not yet absorbed that the quantum physicists were right. The fact that the observation alters the observed object is more general. We try to determine how much it accompanies the whole knowledge. The ancient, especially Chinese, philosophers already knew about that. Philosophical problems are therefore timeless.
They had been fighting till the movement of micro-particles was photographically demonstrated throughout the 1950 and 1960s. We have not yet absorbed that the quantum physicists were right. The fact that the observation alters the observed object is more general. We try to determine how much it accompanies the whole knowledge. The ancient, especially Chinese, philosophers already knew about that. Philosophical problems are therefore timeless.
El tiempo en el que algunos científicos como Einstein (1879-1955) rechazaron la mecánica cuántica.
Habían estado luchando hasta que el movimiento de micro-partículas se demostró fotográficamente durante toda la década de 1950 y 1960. Todavía no hemos asumido que los físicos cuánticos tenían razón. El hecho de que la observación altera el objeto observado es más general. Tratamos de determinar la cantidad que acompaña a todo el conocimiento. Los antiguos filósofos, especialmente de China, ya sabían sobre eso. Los problemas filosóficos son, por lo tanto, atemporales.
Habían estado luchando hasta que el movimiento de micro-partículas se demostró fotográficamente durante toda la década de 1950 y 1960. Todavía no hemos asumido que los físicos cuánticos tenían razón. El hecho de que la observación altera el objeto observado es más general. Tratamos de determinar la cantidad que acompaña a todo el conocimiento. Los antiguos filósofos, especialmente de China, ya sabían sobre eso. Los problemas filosóficos son, por lo tanto, atemporales.
¿De qué trata la filósofia china?
Es específica, ya que no conoce la noción de Dios. La filosofía china hace hincapié en el proceso de transición incesante. Es una aventura sin límites, con determinadas normas de autorregulación, pero sin dirección, destino, es decir, nada en absoluto. Supera nuestra existencia invariable. Nuestra realidad, sin duda, se vive, sin embargo, no necesita tener sentido ni objetivo. Se puede configurar para un cierto período, no universalmente. A través de esta volvemos a donde Heidegger no llegó. Una pregunta es si soy adecuado para asumir esa responsabilidad. Nadie me obliga, y ocurrirá de alguna manera. Los budistas lo saben mejor...
Es específica, ya que no conoce la noción de Dios. La filosofía china hace hincapié en el proceso de transición incesante. Es una aventura sin límites, con determinadas normas de autorregulación, pero sin dirección, destino, es decir, nada en absoluto. Supera nuestra existencia invariable. Nuestra realidad, sin duda, se vive, sin embargo, no necesita tener sentido ni objetivo. Se puede configurar para un cierto período, no universalmente. A través de esta volvemos a donde Heidegger no llegó. Una pregunta es si soy adecuado para asumir esa responsabilidad. Nadie me obliga, y ocurrirá de alguna manera. Los budistas lo saben mejor...
What's Chinese philosophy about?
It is specific as it does not know the notion God. Chinese philosophy emphasizes the process of ceaseless transition. It is an unrestrained affair, with certain auto-regulation norms, but without direction, target, meaning, anything at all. It exceeds our invariable existence. Our reality is undoubtedly live, however it does not need to have meaning or target. It can be set for some period, not universally. Through this we return where Heidegger did not reach. A question is if I am suitable to bear responsibility. Nobody forces me, and it will eventuate somehow. Buddhists know it the best...
It is specific as it does not know the notion God. Chinese philosophy emphasizes the process of ceaseless transition. It is an unrestrained affair, with certain auto-regulation norms, but without direction, target, meaning, anything at all. It exceeds our invariable existence. Our reality is undoubtedly live, however it does not need to have meaning or target. It can be set for some period, not universally. Through this we return where Heidegger did not reach. A question is if I am suitable to bear responsibility. Nobody forces me, and it will eventuate somehow. Buddhists know it the best...
Parece que nada nuevo aparece...
A principios del siglo XXI, la situación es la misma que en todas las ciencias: nos encontramos en el principio. Como Newton (1643-1727) dijo: Estamos de pie sobre los hombros de gigantes. Llegamos al límite del paradigma clásico, llegando al espacio, donde no se puede utilizar. Estamos de nuevo en el comienzo, incluyendo espacios aparentemente cerrados, como la gramática latina. Nada de lo que era cierto en, digamos 1940, es válido. Debemos resolver esta situación, sólo tenemos miedo de tener poco tiempo disponible. Estamos algo confundidos, no es la primera vez en la Historia. Es desagradable, pero también muy optimista, volviendo a los tiempos, en los que todo empieza desde el principio.
A principios del siglo XXI, la situación es la misma que en todas las ciencias: nos encontramos en el principio. Como Newton (1643-1727) dijo: Estamos de pie sobre los hombros de gigantes. Llegamos al límite del paradigma clásico, llegando al espacio, donde no se puede utilizar. Estamos de nuevo en el comienzo, incluyendo espacios aparentemente cerrados, como la gramática latina. Nada de lo que era cierto en, digamos 1940, es válido. Debemos resolver esta situación, sólo tenemos miedo de tener poco tiempo disponible. Estamos algo confundidos, no es la primera vez en la Historia. Es desagradable, pero también muy optimista, volviendo a los tiempos, en los que todo empieza desde el principio.
It seems nothing new appears...
At the beginning of the 21st century, the situation is same in all sciences: we are standing at the very beginning. As Newton (1643-1727) said, we are standing on the shoulders of giants. We achieved the limit of the classic paradigm, getting to the area, where it is unusable. We are again at the very beginning including seemingly closed areas like Latin grammar. Nothing, that was true in let's say 1940, is valid. We should resolve this situation, only we are afraid of little time available. We are at certain confusion, not the first time in history. It is unpleasant, but also very optimistic, returning to times, when all arise from the beginning.
At the beginning of the 21st century, the situation is same in all sciences: we are standing at the very beginning. As Newton (1643-1727) said, we are standing on the shoulders of giants. We achieved the limit of the classic paradigm, getting to the area, where it is unusable. We are again at the very beginning including seemingly closed areas like Latin grammar. Nothing, that was true in let's say 1940, is valid. We should resolve this situation, only we are afraid of little time available. We are at certain confusion, not the first time in history. It is unpleasant, but also very optimistic, returning to times, when all arise from the beginning.
Letter to Naomi...
Dec, 2010Dear Naomi,
Walking along the human skeletons inside of the Parisian catacombs,
I'm aware that wherever u r, whatever u do, we remain like
night and day, life and death, truth and lie...
How could it exist alone?
There has not been such actor yet to express my joy, or except
me as a child watching falling laminas of the roses,
collecting them into the sack put under my pillow.
Happier than happiest?
Foolish warmongers drumming to celebrate a 'victory'
Hurting those without choice, never man 2 man, face 2 face
The rats are braver...
But could I be better (please)?
Some believe behind something, is something, is something...
While I see nothing behind us Naomi, neither in front of us,
nor aside, nor above, nor below...
Like a full cup through which water spills over...
Is philosophy possible..?
Miro...
...letter to Miro
Dear Miro,
I'm promoting the acrobatic shows in Shanghai and Beijing,
so I had no time to write you earlier. And then believe or not,
I could not find a post office... How horrible!
I hope u r already out of the catacombs, it's cold there, u could get flu!
And if you don't see anything above, please visit our oculist, because
right now so many people are standing on the podium above me,
but I like it...
I know you have always loved flowers, maybe you had been florist or
gardener in your previous life, although not sure (just kidding)...
You are philosophy, my tiny philosopher...
And so brave.... braver than a rat :)
See u soon.
Kiss
...Naomi
Miro.Brada.The Trials 1996
Daily Práca, one of 4 winners of the public literature competition Archa Snívavcov 1996
Daily Práca, one of 4 winners of the public literature competition Archa Snívavcov 1996
Meeting with my friend d'apres Descartes
I met my friend in a garden with joyful birds' singing. He said: Politicians are still people.
Me: Do you think so?
He: I think, so I am...
I met my friend in a garden with joyful birds' singing. He said: Politicians are still people.
Me: Do you think so?
He: I think, so I am...
Scientist as a concept
Scientist has blue and green liquids in test tubes. Definition of a scientist: if he mixes up blue and green, it starts emitting smoke. The greater smoke, the greater scientist...
Scientist has blue and green liquids in test tubes. Definition of a scientist: if he mixes up blue and green, it starts emitting smoke. The greater smoke, the greater scientist...
The most important law
Jim is idiot. Bob isn't idiot. Shortly after: Jim isn't idiot, while Bob is becoming idiot. We've just formulated the law of the persistence of idiocy...
Jim is idiot. Bob isn't idiot. Shortly after: Jim isn't idiot, while Bob is becoming idiot. We've just formulated the law of the persistence of idiocy...
Verification of the hypothesis
Nothing is certain, unless reconfirmed.
Neither measurement in physics is valid, unless reconfirmed. So if a husband finds his wife's infidelity, it's untrue, till next verification...
Nothing is certain, unless reconfirmed.
Neither measurement in physics is valid, unless reconfirmed. So if a husband finds his wife's infidelity, it's untrue, till next verification...
Philosopher contra masses
The masses say: philosopher is too rational, no vices. The philosopher logically disproved it, no mentioning his vices...
The masses say: philosopher is too rational, no vices. The philosopher logically disproved it, no mentioning his vices...
In 1995, as a student of psychology, I was drinking jasmine tea and writing an essay entitled 'Existence' (interim thesis). From the analysis of the self-consciousness, I concluded:
"All I know, only I know", because if YOU know 'what I know', only I know that 'YOU know 'what I know'', and if you know that 'only I know that 'YOU know 'what I know''', only I know that... etc
At each moment, I know more (I know that YOU know), or less (I don't know that YOU know that I know) - than YOU. The consciousness is so indivisible implying the permanent 'existential solitude' at the very bottom of each existence.
The meaning of 'existential solitude' can be surprising. E.g., if there are more people (you, he, she, they...) the combination of 'who knows what', and 'who knows 'who knows what'' vastly rises at each moment (and as time flows) implying 'existential divergence' driving each existence further from each other. In contrast, avoiding society minimizes set of 'who knows what' implying 'existential convergence' moving the existence closer to other existences.
I also analysed paranoia (schizophrenia) via replacing 'YOU' with THEY:
If I am realizing 'THEY spy ME', I know it. But do THEY know it? If yes, THEY know more than ME, if not I know more than THEY. So THEY never know, what I know (regardless of their technology).
Replacement 'YOU' by GOD gives a theological example: GOD (if exists or not) all knows, but I know that GOD all knows, and if GOD knows that I know that GOD all knows, I know that, etc.
Mathematically (using kind of calculus) I turned 'All I know, only I know' to a recursive contradiction, formally identical to Ancient Greek paradox of liar (is lying liar lying?) or Zeno (before you reach point B you must pass its half distance, its half distance, etc so point B is unreachable), Russell's paradox in 1901 (does 'set of all sets excluding itself' contain itself?), or some models of game theory.
According to 'All I know, only I know' Descartes's 'I think, so I am' (1644), sounds: only I know that 'I think therefore I am'. But as I am realizing: 'I know that 'I think therefore I am'', I can realize that I am thinking. 'I think' and 'I know' are so mutually exclusive or synonyms (Wittgenstein's language game), that's why 'I think, so I am' could be: 'I know, so I am'.
Related links:
Convergence and divergence of economics (15 Sep 2004) - I applied 'existencial divergence' to economics via dependence of asset pricing and causality on expectations of future prices, and expectations of expectations (of others) of future prices... The more actors the more possibilities of 'who can know what', which leads to divergence / crisis, i.e. impossibility to determine the asset prices and causality (what causes what). And the longer the analysis (of prices) is lasting, the higher impreciseness of the analysis.
God knows that I know that God everything knows (14 Feb 2002) - I applied 'existencial solitude' to analysis of the economic value - determined by so called marginal utility, when the value of the thing diminishes by its owned quantity: 'the first unit of consumption of a good or service yields more utility than the second and subsequent units'. In contrast the motivation of 'collector' can be opposite - the value of the missing thing (from the collection) can be higher (or at least not less) than the things already in the collection... And the motivation of the collector can outweigh the marginal utility...
"All I know, only I know", because if YOU know 'what I know', only I know that 'YOU know 'what I know'', and if you know that 'only I know that 'YOU know 'what I know''', only I know that... etc
At each moment, I know more (I know that YOU know), or less (I don't know that YOU know that I know) - than YOU. The consciousness is so indivisible implying the permanent 'existential solitude' at the very bottom of each existence.
The meaning of 'existential solitude' can be surprising. E.g., if there are more people (you, he, she, they...) the combination of 'who knows what', and 'who knows 'who knows what'' vastly rises at each moment (and as time flows) implying 'existential divergence' driving each existence further from each other. In contrast, avoiding society minimizes set of 'who knows what' implying 'existential convergence' moving the existence closer to other existences.
I also analysed paranoia (schizophrenia) via replacing 'YOU' with THEY:
If I am realizing 'THEY spy ME', I know it. But do THEY know it? If yes, THEY know more than ME, if not I know more than THEY. So THEY never know, what I know (regardless of their technology).
Replacement 'YOU' by GOD gives a theological example: GOD (if exists or not) all knows, but I know that GOD all knows, and if GOD knows that I know that GOD all knows, I know that, etc.
Mathematically (using kind of calculus) I turned 'All I know, only I know' to a recursive contradiction, formally identical to Ancient Greek paradox of liar (is lying liar lying?) or Zeno (before you reach point B you must pass its half distance, its half distance, etc so point B is unreachable), Russell's paradox in 1901 (does 'set of all sets excluding itself' contain itself?), or some models of game theory.
According to 'All I know, only I know' Descartes's 'I think, so I am' (1644), sounds: only I know that 'I think therefore I am'. But as I am realizing: 'I know that 'I think therefore I am'', I can realize that I am thinking. 'I think' and 'I know' are so mutually exclusive or synonyms (Wittgenstein's language game), that's why 'I think, so I am' could be: 'I know, so I am'.
Related links:
Convergence and divergence of economics (15 Sep 2004) - I applied 'existencial divergence' to economics via dependence of asset pricing and causality on expectations of future prices, and expectations of expectations (of others) of future prices... The more actors the more possibilities of 'who can know what', which leads to divergence / crisis, i.e. impossibility to determine the asset prices and causality (what causes what). And the longer the analysis (of prices) is lasting, the higher impreciseness of the analysis.
God knows that I know that God everything knows (14 Feb 2002) - I applied 'existencial solitude' to analysis of the economic value - determined by so called marginal utility, when the value of the thing diminishes by its owned quantity: 'the first unit of consumption of a good or service yields more utility than the second and subsequent units'. In contrast the motivation of 'collector' can be opposite - the value of the missing thing (from the collection) can be higher (or at least not less) than the things already in the collection... And the motivation of the collector can outweigh the marginal utility...
Look at the chess diagram below (or open its facebook link) to see the 2nd prize (I won) in the British journal The Problemist (1997), for mate in 2 moves with the cyclic change of key and 2 mates (try / solution). Composing the chess problems (I did) is a mental free-skating, gymnastic, choreography... The judge(s) ranks the best compositions according to their originality, intricacy, and economical construction.
'How difficult to solve it' had been the first criterion for the best compositions. Later Italians G Cristoffanini and A Mari (en l'Echiquier Belge 1928) focused on the change of mates (new strategy) to produce reciprocal changes of mates - a double jump (AB-BA). A cyclic change of mates - a triple jump (ABC-BCA) prototype was composed by Slovak L Lacny (1949), followed by Scottish N Macleod (1950), followed by the 1st quadruple jump (1955) composed again by Lacny, etc...Picasso had defined sort of 'new strategy' in cubism (Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, 1907) changing the African masks' attributes. Likewise objects' metamorphosis by MC Escher (1898-1972), the time lines of Hitchcock's Vertigo (1958), the discrete energy elements: E = hv, of M Planck quantum hypothesis (1900), the discovery of infinitesimal calculus (new mathematics) by I Newton and G Leibniz in the late 17th century, 'Epic of Gilgamesh' from ancient Mesopotamia turning the fear of death into (one of) the first literature's form(s), etc...The "new strategy" coincides with the Chinese ceaseless transition (change), challenging the 'identity' relation on which the European science clings.The identity in equations of mathematics / chemistry / physics, is illusionary as the left hand side differs (by position, time) from the right hand side (Heraclitus Panta Rhei): P is not P. Understanding the "new aesthetics' behind the changes of the same units is a real personal revolution in thinking.Am I exaggerating?
Not at all (pas du tout)...MiRO BRADA, london, 4. MaY, 2010
Not at all (pas du tout)...MiRO BRADA, london, 4. MaY, 2010
The idea of this 3-mover (below) came suddenly up as I was listening Wagner's Tannhäuser overture (1845).
I used to listen music - classic, jazz, modern, as I was composing chess problems.
From the classic I preferred Bach, Debussy, Schubert, Chopin, Beethoven, Brahms, Mozart,
Stravinsky among others.
This symmetrical new-strategic 3-mover contains 2 variants of set plays with 2 solutions.
Mutual comparison of the 2nd moves gives: 3 x 2 change (Zagorujko), 4 paradoxes (2 Dombrovskis, 2 Hannelius), 2 functions' changes (2nd x 3rd moves).
Juror Bedrich Formánek President of the FIDE for Chess Composition 1994-2002 wrote:
Excellent three fold three-mover, containing not only the tier change of the second moves of the white
in two variants, but also the threats' paradoxes, changes of mates and various changes of functions of the moves.
Motivation is not complicated, but engages by its wit (e.g. opening the lines via e6, opening Re1 by keys etc.).
The modern composition, whose symmetry I don't feel as a shortage.
At time of listening and composing that problem I did not know Tannhäuser opera's plot, but I felt its controversy (non-linearity), which was the impetus to my three phases' mechanism.
Nietzsche being a close Wagner's friend saw potential of his music to rebirth a tragedy to fully affirm the life. He was read by writers Mann, Gide, Joyce... philosophers Foucault, Sartre, Heidegger... politicians Mussolini, de Gaulle, Roosevelt... artists Dalí, Bowie, Björk... and his metaphysics of 'eternal return of the same' or 'superhuman' stands against the egalitarian morality creating 'bad' to blemish the stronger. But who is the stronger, and what are criteria?
'Whoever in power is stronger' is often untrue, e.g. was Galileo weaker than the authorities that silenced him? Were Galileo's ideas mere means to undermine the stronger authorities? Very few would agree... How then distinguish 'stronger' and 'weaker'?
People can be equally strong (or weak) in many areas, but statistically same person is stronger in one thing, while weaker or average in other. Is then a superhuman rather e.g. J. Sotomayor jumping 2.45m (1993) or business magnate B. Gates?
Those considered best do not need to be best either. B. Gates made money from programming, when minority had a computer. What would Gates have done, being born in Africa? Clearly 'stronger' or 'weaker' depends on society permitting or denying 'superhuman'. It rather confirms Nietzsche's 'reevaluation of all values' underlying relativity.
In Wille zur Macht he disliked determinism and causality (past to future) dominated the natural science e.g. thermodynamics of Kelvin (1824-1907). He emphasized the will perpetually alters the finite state, kind of the 20th century quantum physics. At the same time he doubted 'probability' in exploration of the dynamic truth, which is contradictory. Then Nietzsche's 'superhuman' or 'eternal return' is similar idealization as Kant's thing in itself, Plato's idea, Rousseau's natural man...
Nietzsche's philosophy is unfinished, because he did not express dynamics of his ideas statistically (mental breakdown is other issue).
People can be equally strong (or weak) in many areas, but statistically same person is stronger in one thing, while weaker or average in other. Is then a superhuman rather e.g. J. Sotomayor jumping 2.45m (1993) or business magnate B. Gates?
Those considered best do not need to be best either. B. Gates made money from programming, when minority had a computer. What would Gates have done, being born in Africa? Clearly 'stronger' or 'weaker' depends on society permitting or denying 'superhuman'. It rather confirms Nietzsche's 'reevaluation of all values' underlying relativity.
In Wille zur Macht he disliked determinism and causality (past to future) dominated the natural science e.g. thermodynamics of Kelvin (1824-1907). He emphasized the will perpetually alters the finite state, kind of the 20th century quantum physics. At the same time he doubted 'probability' in exploration of the dynamic truth, which is contradictory. Then Nietzsche's 'superhuman' or 'eternal return' is similar idealization as Kant's thing in itself, Plato's idea, Rousseau's natural man...
Nietzsche's philosophy is unfinished, because he did not express dynamics of his ideas statistically (mental breakdown is other issue).
